Quantum Risk Reaches Beyond Finsei’s Own Systems
Finsei says quantum readiness depends less on rewriting its code than on getting banks, card schemes and clearing systems to plan encryption upgrades.
Finsei says the financial industry’s preparation for quantum computing will depend on replacing vulnerable encryption across the payment systems used by banks, card schemes and clearing providers.
The fintech’s cloud-based platform can adopt post-quantum protections more easily than older banking infrastructure. Hybrid post-quantum key exchange is enabled by default in major browsers and at large cloud providers, giving newer firms some protection without requiring a full system rebuild.
The wider payment chain is harder to upgrade. Finsei’s transactions can involve Visa infrastructure, banks that hold safeguarded customer funds and clearing systems that process different currencies. A company paying suppliers in several countries can therefore be exposed to the least-protected system in that chain.
Finsei asks partners for migration dates during due diligence and contract renewals, rather than accepting general assurances. Payment schemes and processors are likely to set the pace because thousands of businesses depend on them.
The risk is concentrated in public-key encryption, including RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. These systems protect key exchanges and digital signatures used to authenticate banks, payment instructions and software updates. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could solve the mathematical problems behind those systems.
The timing is uncertain, but estimates of the computing power needed to break current encryption have fallen. In 2019, the estimated requirement for breaking RSA-2048 was about 20 million noisy qubits. A 2025 paper by Craig Gidney put the estimate below one million qubits, with a projected runtime of less than a week. No such computer currently exists.
Attackers can collect encrypted data now and try to decrypt it later, a practice known as “harvest now, decrypt later.” This creates a risk for information that remains sensitive for many years, including passport scans, account histories, beneficial ownership records and corporate payment data. Data with a short useful life, such as an expiring card number, faces less exposure.
Digital signatures pose a separate risk. If attackers can forge them, they could impersonate a bank, authorise payments or distribute software updates that appear legitimate. Finsei says firms should therefore plan for both key exchange and authentication changes.
The UK National Cyber Security Centre, the European Union’s coordinated roadmap and the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology have called for organisations to begin preparing now, address the riskiest systems around 2030 and complete the work by the middle of the 2030s. The specific deadlines differ by regulator.
The first task is to create an inventory of cryptography in libraries, vendor products, certificates, virtual private networks and application programming interfaces. The NCSC calls for this discovery work to be completed by 2028. Companies should also identify data that must remain confidential beyond 2035, assess suppliers’ migration plans and assign a named owner for the programme.
Finsei recommends adding “crypto-agility” to procurement requirements so new systems can adopt replacement algorithms without a full rebuild. It also warns that scammers are using quantum security as a phishing lure. Firms should tell customers they will never request a “quantum security upgrade” through an email or link.








